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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
ERIC PECTOL, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20060546-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
& & & 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant was convicted of discharging a firearm from a vehicle, a third degree 
felony under Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508 (West 2004). R. 99-102. This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
ISSUE ON APPEAL & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Defendant stole a Blazer as a means of satisfying a drug debt. When the owner 
retrieved the Blazer, defendant followed him home, confronted him in the street, and 
fired a black .380 semiautomatic handgun at him from a moving vehicle. 
Issue la: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by permitting the prosecutor to 
question a witness about whether he saw defendant with a black .380 semiautomatic 
handgun later that evening? 
Issue lb: Did the trial court abuse its discretion by admitting testimony regarding 
the underlying drug debt? 
Standard of Review: A trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 404(b), 
Utah Rules of Evidence, is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Bradley, 2002 
UT App 348, \ 12, 57 P.3d 1139. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-508 (West 2004): 
(l)(a) A person may not discharge any kind of dangerous weapon or firearm: 
(i) from an automobile or other vehicle;.. . 
(2) A violation of any provision of this section is a class B misdemeanor unless the 
actor discharges a firearm under any of the following circumstances not amounting to 
criminal homicide or attempted criminal homicide, in which case it is a third degree 
felony and the convicted person shall be sentenced to an enhanced minimum term of 
three years in prison: 
(a) the actor discharges a firearm in the direction of any person or persons, knowing 
or having reason to believe that any person may be endangered; 
(b) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another or with intent to damage a 
habitable structure as defined in Subsection 76-6-101(2), discharges a firearm in the 
direction of any building; or 
(c) the actor, with intent to intimidate or harass another, discharges a firearm in the 
direction of any vehicle. 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 403: 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or 
needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 404(b): 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character 
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be 
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident, provided 
2 
that upon request by the accused, the prosecution in a criminal case shall provide 
reasonable notice in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial 
notice on good cause shown, of the nature of any such evidence it intends to 
introduce at trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count of discharging a firearm from a vehicle and 
one count of attempted murder. R. 1. In the first count, the State alleged that defendant 
fired a gun at Michael Wilbert from a moving vehicle. R. 342: 3-4. In the second, the 
State alleged that defendant shot Travis Montes after defendant returned to his apartment 
later that evening. R. 342: 4. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to sever the two 
charges. R. 46. * 
The State9s motions in limine 
The State filed two pretrial motions in limine to determine the admissibility of 
testimony that it planned on introducing at trial. R. 342: 2-26. In the first motion, the 
State requested permission to examine Richard Porter about the Montes shooting. R. 
342: 4-8. Porter was driving the car when defendant fired at Michael Wilbert, and he was 
also with defendant at defendant's apartment when the Montes shooting occurred. R. 
342: 4-8. Porter told police the next day that defendant had a .380 semiautomatic during 
both shootings. R. 342: 6-7. This matched Michael Wilbert's description of the gun that 
1
 The record does not contain a ruling on the motion to sever. In his appellate 
brief, defendant states that the motion to sever was granted. Aplt. Br. 5. Because 
defendant received two separate trials, R. 99-102; 290-94, the State agrees that the 
motion to sever was at some point granted. 
This appeal is from defendant's conviction of discharging a firearm from a 
vehicle. Aplt. Br. 1-22. Unless otherwise indicated, all references in this brief are to the 
proceedings relating to that charge. 
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defendant had fired at him. R. 342: 8. The State accordingly sought permission to 
question Porter at trial regarding the Montes shooting in order to support its claim that 
defendant had a .380 semiautomatic handgun during the Wilbert shooting. Defendant 
objected, arguing that this evidence was inadmissible under rules 403 and 404(b), Utah 
Rules of Evidence. R. 342: 9-13. 
Following argument, the trial court ruled that Porter could testify regarding 
defendant's possession of a gun at the apartment, the type of gun that he had, and whether 
Porter had heard defendant fire the gun. R. 342: 25. The court also ruled that Porter 
could not testify regarding the fact that defendant had shot someone with the gun. R. 
342:25. 
In the second motion in limine, the State requested permission to question Porter 
regarding a drug deal that defendant had with Stacy Wilbert. The State alleged that this 
drug deal was the basis for defendant's confrontation with the Wilberts and that it 
therefore provided context and motive for the shooting. R. 342: 8-9. 
Defendant did not object to this second motion in limine, but instead affirmatively 
agreed that the evidence was admissible. R. 342: 14. Given this concession, the State did 
not argue the drug issue during its rebuttal. R. 342: 15. After the court ruled on the gun 
issue, it asked if either party needed clarification. R. 342: 25. Defendant's counsel did 
not ask for a ruling on the drug issue, but instead again affirmed that he did not have any 
objection to that testimony. R. 342: 25 ("[The] Drug testimony is fine."). At trial, 
defendant's counsel openly discussed the drug testimony with the jury. R. 343: 100-03, 
4 
140; 344: 385 (informing the jury that it was "entitled to know" about the "elements of 
drug involvement" in the case). 
Richard Porter testifies regarding defendant's possession of the 
.380 semiautomatic at trial 
Porter testified at trial. R. 343: 152-219; 344: 219-247. When the prosecutor 
asked him whether defendant had a gun at his apartment, the court excused the jury and 
specifically instructed Porter not to mention that defendant had shot anyone at the 
apartment. R. 343: 178-85. Pursuant to the court's instructions, Porter was not allowed 
to inform the jury that defendant had shot anyone. R. 343: 152-219; 344: 219-248. 
Instead, the State questioned Porter about the Wilbert confrontation, as well as his 
statement to police that defendant had possessed and fired a .380 later that night. R. 343: 
152-210; 344: 219-248. 
Porter ultimately recanted most of the statements that he had made to police 
during their investigation. Porter denied that he and defendant had followed the Wilberts 
home, instead claiming that he and defendant had "just happened to come upon them" in 
front of their home. R. 343: 173. Porter still admitted that there had been an "angry" 
confrontation in front of the Wilbert home, but now claimed that defendant did not have a 
gun at that time. R. 343: 168-74, 175, 195-96. 
Defendant was convicted and timely appealed. R. 102, 162. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS2 
Stacy Wilbert began selling methamphetamine to defendant in the spring of 2004. 
R. 343: 81-82. Defendant subsequently loaned Stacy Wilbert $2400 so that she could 
buy a quarter pound of methamphetamine. R. 343: 81-83. In return, Stacy Wilbert 
agreed to give defendant an ounce of methamphetamine and then repay the loan after she 
had sold the other three ounces. R. 343: 82. Stacy Wilbert later sold the 
methamphetamine and repaid defendant. R. 343: 83. Defendant, however, believed that 
Stacy Wilbert still owed him between $400 and $450. R. 343: 83. 
Michael Wilbert, Stacy's husband, subsequently loaned his Chevy Blazer to 
defendant's live-in girlfriend while he was repairing her car. R. 343: 121, 123. On 
September 6, 2004, defendant's girlfriend informed Michael Wilbert that defendant had 
taken the Blazer. R. 343: 121-22. When Michael Wilbert called defendant, defendant 
told him that he took the Blazer because of Stacy Wilbert's drug debt. R. 343: 124, 141. 
Defendant and Michael Wilbert then exchanged obscenities and threats over the phone. 
R. 343:122. 
Later that night, Michael and Stacy Wilbert met and went looking for their Blazer. 
R. 343: 85-86. They found it parked behind defendant's apartment. R. 343: 86, 126. 
Michael Wilbert retrieved the Blazer, and he and his wife began driving it home together. 
R. 343:86-87, 126. 
2
 The following facts are recited in the light most favorable to the jury verdict. See 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 112, 12 P.3d 92. 
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Defendant and his long-time friend Richard Porter had spent the day building 
shelves at Porter's house. R. 343: 154-55, 157. At some point in the evening, Porter and 
defendant went driving in Porter's white Cadillac. R. 343: 152, 161-62. Defendant was 
"tweaking hard" on methamphetamine at the time, R. 343: 201, and Porter was driving. 
R. 343: 161-62,189. 
As the Wilberts were driving home, they noticed that a white Cadillac had begun 
following them. R. 343: 87-90, 128. As the white Cadillac pulled up behind them, it 
began flashing its headlights. R. 343: 88-89, 128. The white Cadillac followed the 
Wilberts all the way to their home. R. 343: 88-90. 
Michael Wilbert stopped the Blazer in the middle of the road in front of their 
driveway. R. 343: 90, 104-06. The Cadillac stopped about 10 feet behind them. R. 343: 
104-06. Stacy Wilbert got out of the Blazer and approached the passenger side of the 
Cadillac to see who had been following them. R. 343: 90. Defendant stepped out of the 
passenger side door of the Cadillac and began yelling at Stacy Wilbert. R. 343: 92. 
Defendant called her a "f— in' cunt" and told her that he wanted his money. R. 343: 92. 
Defendant raised a small black handgun into the air. R. 343: 130-31. Stacy 
shouted at her husband, "Michael, he's got a gun. He's got a gun, go go." R. 343: 130, 
175. Stacy Wilbert then ran toward her house. R. 343: 93. 
Michael Wilbert threw the Blazer into reverse and "was going to back up into the 
Cadillac to create a diversion" and "to try to keep from getting shot." R. 343: 131. 
Defendant jumped back into the Cadillac, and the Cadillac sped off. R. 343: 131. 
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Michael Wilbert turned around and followed the Cadillac. R. 343: 131. After 
both cars had turned the corner, defendant "leaned out the passenger side window and 
discharged a shot out of the firearm in [Michael Wilbert]'s direction." R. 343: 132. 
Michael Wilbert heard the sound and saw the muzzle flash from defendant's gun. R. 
343: 132. Michael Wilbert has personal experience with guns and recognized that the 
shot had come from a .380 semiautomatic. R. 343: 132-33. Michael Wilbert followed 
the Cadillac a little bit further and then returned to his house. R. 343: 132. 
Shortly after the cars had pulled away and turned the corner, Stacy Wilbert heard a 
sound "like a firecracker." R. 343: 93, 110. She ran inside her house and told her 
roommate Nicki Mancuso that "they were shooting at Michael." R. 343: 94; 344: 333. 
Keira Iman, a neighbor of the Wilberts, heard a "firecracker noise" that night as well and 
thought that it sounded like a gunshot. R. 344: 331-32. 
As defendant and Porter drove away, Porter turned to defendant and said, "What 
the f—, man?" R. 343: 208. Defendant responded, "Oh sorry, I just lost it." R. 343: 
208. The two went to Porter's home for approximately 45 minutes and then drove to 
defendant's apartment. R. 343: 176. While Porter was standing in defendant's kitchen, 
he heard defendant fire his gun in another room. R. 343: 176-77.3 
Police spoke with Porter the next morning as part of their investigation into the 
shooting at defendant's apartment. R. 344: 267-68. In his initial statement, Porter told 
police that defendant had used a small, black, semi-automatic pistol. R. 344: 270. In a 
3
 As noted above, this shooting was the subject of the attempted murder charge. 
Defendant was convicted on that charge in a subsequent trial. R. 290-96. 
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subsequent interview, Porter clarified that the gun was a .380 semi-automatic. R. 344: 
282. Several days after retrieving his Blazer, Michael Wilbert found a clip of bullets 
underneath the driver's seat. R. 343: 135, 144. The clip did not belong to Michael, and 
he did not know how the clip got into his car. R. 343: 144. Michael turned the clip over 
to the police, who determined that the clip contained bullets for a .380. R. 344: 298. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant first argues that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 
testimony that defendant had possessed and fired a .380 handgun at his apartment shortly 
after the Wilbert shooting. Defendant claims that this testimony should have been 
excluded under rule 404(b). The trial court expressly prevented the State from 
introducing any evidence that the possession or shooting was in any way criminal, 
however, and this testimony therefore did not fall within the ambit of rule 404(b). 
Contrary to defendant's claims, this testimony was also admissible under rule 
404(b). The testimony was not introduced as evidence of defendant's character, but 
rather to support the State's claim that defendant had an operable .380 handgun on the 
night in question. The testimony was directly relevant to the elements of the crime at 
issue, and defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by its admission. 
Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting 
testimony regarding his drug deal with Stacy Wilbert. Defendant invited the alleged 
error, however, by affirmatively conceding that this testimony was admissible. This 
Court should therefore decline to address this claim. 
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Contrary to defendant's claims, this testimony was also admissible under rule 
404(b). The testimony was properly introduced to provide motive and context for the 
defendant's confrontation with the Wilberts, and defendant was not unfairly prejudiced 
by its admission. 
ARGUMENT 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY ADMITTING 
THE CHALLENGED TESTIMONY 
Defendant argues that the court abused its discretion by (1) allowing the State to 
question Porter regarding the shooting at defendant's apartment, and (2) allowing the 
State to introduce testimony regarding defendant's drug deal with Stacy Wilbert. Aplt. 
Br. 14-21. Defendant argues that this testimony should have been excluded under rules 
403 and 404(b)? Utah Rules of Evidence. Aplt. Br. 14-21. 
As explained below, however, Porter's testimony regarding the shooting was 
relevant to show that defendant possessed the crime weapon on the night in question. 
Porter's testimony regarding his drug deal with Stacy Wilbert was also relevant to 
establish his motive for taking the Blazer and then shooting at Michael Wilbert. Both of 
defendant's arguments should be rejected. 
A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to question 
Porter about the shooting at defendant's apartment. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established a three-step process for analyzing claims 
under rule 404(b). First, the court must "determine whether the bad acts evidence is 
being offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." State v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 
59, Tf 18, 6 P.3d 1120. Second, the "court must determine whether the bad acts evidence 
10 
meets the requirements of rule 402, which permits admission of only relevant evidence." 
Id. at If 19. Third, the court must "determine whether the bad acts evidence meets the 
requirements of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Id. at \ 20. 
1. Rule 404(b) is inapplicable to this claim because the State did not 
introduce any testimony showing that this shooting was in any way 
wrongful. 
As a threshold matter, this Court should reject defendant's claim because it does 
not implicate evidence within the scope of rule 404(b). 
Rule 404(b) only applies when a party offers evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or 
acts." It is a "fundamental principle of statutory construction that 'terms of a statute are 
to be interpreted as a comprehensive whole and not in a piecemeal fashion.'" Bus. 
Aviation o/S.D., Inc. v. Medivest, Inc., 882 P.2d 662, 665 (Utah 1994) (citations 
omitted). The meaning of words should accordingly "be determined in light of their 
association with surrounding words and phrases." Id. (citations omitted); see also 
Calhoun v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 2004 UT 56, f 18, 96 P.3d 916 ("[Wjhen 
deciding questions of statutory interpretation we do not look to language in isolation. 
Rather, we look first to the statute's plain language, in relation to the statute as a whole, 
to determine its meaning."). In addition, "the rule of ejusdem generis requires that 'when 
general words or terms follow specific ones, the general must be understood as applying 
to things of the same kind as the specific.'" CP Nat. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of 
Utah, 638 P.2d 519, 523 (Utah 1981) (citation omitted). 
As noted above, rule 404(b) applies when a party introduces evidence regarding 
"crimes, wrongs or acts." Though the terms "crimes" and "wrongs" both specifically 
11 
connote impropriety, the general term "acts" is left undefined. Given the rules of 
construction referenced above, courts have commonly held that the term refers to "bad 
acts." See, e.g., United States v. Jobson, 102 F.3d 214, 219 n.4 (6th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. McMillon, 14 F.3d 948, 955 (4th Cir. 1994); United States v. Cooper, 577 F.2d 
1079, 1087-88 (6th Cir. 1978); State v. Crane, 799 P.2d 1380, 1384 (Ariz. 1990); Gattis 
v. State, 637 A.2d 808, 818-19 (Del. 1994); Klauenbergv. State, 735 A.2d 1061, 1071-
73 (Md. Ct. App. 1999). Utah's courts have implicitly adopted this construction by 
repeatedly discussing the rule in terms of "bad acts." See, e.g., State v. Houskeeper, 
2002 UT 118, f 28, 62 P.3d 444; State v. Johnson, 2007 UT App 184, ffif 29-34, 579 
Utah Adv. Rep. 5; State v. Barter, 2007 UT App 5, ffij 23-31, 155 P.3d 116; State v. 
Norcutt, 2006 UT App 269,1fl[ 21-23, 139 P.3d 1066; State v. Atkin, 2006 UT App 155, 
fflf 16-17, 135P.3d894. 
In State v. Lee, 886 A.2d 378 (Vt. 2005), the Vermont Supreme Court rejected a 
rule 404(b) claim similar to this one because the defendant had "not explained how the 
mere possession of a firearm amounts to a bad act. The trial court's ruling recognizes 
that gun ownership in Vermont is not unusual.. . . Absent evidence to demonstrate that 
defendant's gun possession was somehow wrongful, the court was not required to 
analyze admission of the evidence under a Rule 404(b) standard." Id. at 384. In Pickens 
v. State, 764 N.E.2d 295 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002), the Indiana Court of Appeals likewise held 
that "it is 'by no means clear that weapons possession, evidence of gun sales, and the 
like, are necessarily prior 'bad acts' for 404(b) purposes.'" Id. at 299 (citation omitted). 
A number of other courts have reached similar results. See, e.g., Sims v. State, 928 So.2d 
12 
984, 990 (Miss. Ct. App. 2006) ("Sims does not direct this Court to any precedent 
indicating that the contemporaneous possession of an extra gun during a shooting 
constitutes a prior bad act within the ambit of M.R.E. 404(b)."); State v. Loftin, 670 A.2d 
557, 565-66 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) ("[T]he rubber mask, the bullets, and the 
testimony revealing that defendant's gun was in possession of the authorities from 
another jurisdiction bear no resemblance to the other wrongs or acts addressed by the 
courts with respect to N.J.R.E. 404(b). It is neither illegal nor wrongful to possess a 
rubber mask or ammunition."); State v. Reid, 213 S.W.3d 792, 814 (Term. 2006) ("In our 
view, the ownership of these weapons, standing alone, does not constitute a crime. The 
testimony that Roberts saw the defendant in the possession of weapons similar to those 
used in the crimes did not necessarily constitute evidence of a bad act."). 
The trial court in this case expressly limited the discussion of the shooting at the 
apartment. The State was allowed to question Porter about whether he saw defendant 
with a gun later that night, the type of gun, and whether defendant had fired it, but the 
State was not allowed to question Porter about whether defendant had shot anyone with 
the gun. The State also did not introduce any evidence indicating that the shooting at the 
apartment had in any way been criminal. Given this, the testimony was simply not "bad 
act" evidence and it was therefore not subject to rule 404(b). 
2. The testimony regarding the shooting at the apartment was introduced 
for the proper purpose of establishing the elements of the crime at 
issue. 
Even if rule 404(b) was applicable, it was not violated in this case. As noted 
above, the first step in the rule 404(b) analysis is to determine the purpose for which the 
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evidence was offered. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, % 18. Under rule 404(b), 
evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" cannot be offered to "prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity therewith." Such evidence may be offered, 
however, "for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, 
plan, knowledge, identity or absence of mistake or accident." Utah R. Evid. R. 404(b). 
Rule 404(b) is an "inclusionary rule with regard to other crimes evidence which is 
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose." State v. Decor so, 1999 UT 57, f^ 24, 993 
P.2d 837. "Rule 404(b) does not exclude evidence unless it fits an exception; rather, it 
allows admission of relevant evidence 'other than to show merely the general disposition 
of the defendant.'" State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134, 137 (Utah App. 1989) (citation 
omitted). "Evidence demonstrating other purposes is not precluded so long as the 
evidence is offered for a legitimate purpose other than to show the defendant's propensity 
to commit the crime charged." State v. Allen, 2005 UT 11, ^ 17, 108 P.3d 730. Thus, 
"[p]rior bad act evidence is only excluded where the sole reason it is being offered is to 
prove bad character or to show that a person acted in conformity with that character." 
State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 700 (Utah App. 1993) (emphasis in original). 
The testimony regarding the apartment shooting was offered for two proper 
purposes. First, the testimony was offered to support Michael Wilbert's claim that 
defendant fired a .380 at him, thereby satisfying an element of the crime at issue. In State 
v. Bisner, 2001 UT 99, 37 P.3d 1073, the supreme court held that bad act evidence is 
admissible where it "tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime charged . . . 
other than the defendant's propensity to commit crime." Id. at f^ 55 (internal quotations 
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and citation omitted)). In Jamison, this Court likewise held that "[e]vidence that tends to 
prove an element of the crime is admissible." 767 P.2d at 137. While the rule therefore 
"precludes admission of evidence of prior bad acts to prove the disposition of an accused 
to commit the crime charged," such evidence "can be admitted to prove commission of 
the crime when the evidence is otherwise relevant to an element of the crime." State v. 
Collier, 736 P.2d 231, 234 (Utah 1987) (emphasis in original). "When evidence 
establishes elements of the crime of which the defendant is accused, it is admissible even 
though it tends to prove that the defendant has committed other crimes." O 'Neil, 848 
P.2d at 700 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
In order to convict defendant, the State was required to prove that defendant fired 
a firearm during his confrontation with the Wilberts. Utah Code Annotated § 76-10-
508(l)(a) (West 2004). Although the State did not have forensic evidence proving that 
defendant fired a gun at Michael Wilbert, it did have the testimony of Michael Wilbert, 
who claimed that defendant had fired at him with a .380. R. 343: 132-33. Porter's initial 
statements to police supported this claim, insofar as Porter had specifically told officers 
that defendant had a .380 semiautomatic later that night at his apartment. R. 343: 196-97. 
Insofar as the State claimed that this was the same weapon, Porter's testimony directly 
linked defendant to the crime at issue and was therefore admissible for that purpose. See 
United States v. Shea, 159 F.3d 37, 38-39 (1st Cir. 1998); United States v. Smith, 101 
F.3d 202, 211 (1st Cir. 1996); United States v. Roberts, 933 F.2d 517, 520 (7th Cir. 
1991); United States v. Towne, 870 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1989). 
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Second, the testimony was also properly admitted to establish that defendant had 
the opportunity to commit the crime at issue. When faced with similar challenges, courts 
have commonly allowed the government to introduce evidence that the defendant had 
access to the crime weapon in order to show that the defendant had the opportunity to 
commit the crime at issue. See, e.g., Jobson, 102 F.3d at 221; United States v. Hamilton, 
992F.2d 1126, 1130-31 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Co velli, 738 F. 2d 847, 855 (7th 
Cir. 1984); People v. Rivers, 70 P.3d 531, 538 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002); Dickens v. State, 
754 N.E.2d 1, 4 (Ind. 2001); State v. Knox, 464 N.W.2d 445, 449 (Iowa 1990); Smith v. 
State, 729 So.2d 1191, 1205-06 (Miss. 199S); Andrews v. State, 78 S.W.3d 13, 19-20 
(Tex. Crim. App. 2002). 
In this case, Michael Wilbert testified that defendant fired at him using a .380 
semiautomatic. Porter's testimony confirmed that defendant had an operable .380 
semiautomatic less than an hour after the shooting, thereby establishing defendant's 
access to the gun in question and accordant opportunity to commit this particular crime. 
This was a proper purpose under rule 404(b). 
3. The testimony regarding defendant's possession of a .380 was 
relevant. 
The second step in a rule 404(b) analysis is to determine whether the evidence was 
relevant. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, ^ 19. Evidence is relevant when it has "any 
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of 
the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Utah 
R. Evid. R. 401. "Under the minimal threshold of Rule 401, relevancy objections should 
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be seldom sustained if counsel offering the evidence can explain the rational connection 
between the evidence offered and the issues of consequence in the case." R. Collin 
Mangrum & Hon. Dee Benson, Mangrum & Benson on Utah Evidence 108 (2005). "If 
evidence would make a disputed fact of consequence more probable in any degree, then 
the evidence satisfies the level of probative value required by Rule 401." Id. at 109. In 
addition, "if the evidence has relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding the 
instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose; and the fact that it may tend to connect the 
defendant with another crime[, wrong, or act] will not render it incompetent." State v. 
Johnson, 784 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Utah 1989); see also Collier, 736 P.2d at 234 ('The 
evidence can be admitted to prove commission of the crime when the evidence is 
otherwise relevant to an element of the crime."); Jamison, 767 P.2d at 137 ("Evidence 
that tends to prove an element of the crime is admissible."). 
As discussed above, Richard Porter told officers that defendant had an operable 
.380 handgun with him shortly after the Wilbert shooting, which corroborated Michael 
Wilbert's claim that defendant had fired a .380 semiautomatic at him from Porter's 
Cadillac. This made it more probable that defendant fired a .380 at Michael Wilbert than 
it would have been without the testimony, and it was therefore directly relevant under 
rule 402. 
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4. The probative value of the gun evidence was not substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. 
The third step in a rule 404(b) analysis is to determine whether the evidence 
"meets the requirements of rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence." Nelson-Waggoner, 
2000 UT 59, % 20. 
Under rule 403, relevant evidence "may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice." When bad acts evidence is 
challenged under rule 403, this Court considers "'a variety of matters . . . including the 
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, the similarities between 
the crimes, the interval of time that has elapsed between the crimes, the need for the 
evidence, the efficacy of alternative proof, and the degree to which the evidence probably 
will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.'" State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, \ 32, 
61 P.3d 291 (citation omitted). This testimony was admissible under this test. 
First, the evidence introduced at trial not only established that defendant had fired 
a .380 at his apartment, but also linked that shooting to the events in question here. 
Specifically, Richard Porter gave a statement to police following the shootings in which 
he stated that defendant had fired a .380 at the apartment. Porter's reference to a .380 
directly corroborated Michael Wilbert's claim that defendant had and fired a .380 at him 
from Porter's car earlier that evening.4 
4
 But for defendant's objection, Porter's claim that defendant shot the gun in his 
apartment would also have been corroborated by the same evidence that was 
subsequently used to convict defendant of attempted murder. 
In addition, the fact that these cases were severed from each other does not mean 
that the evidence from the Montes shooting would have been inadmissible in the first 
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Second, the interval of time between the two incidents was insignificant. In 
Decor so, the supreme court referred to an interval of seven months as being "relatively 
short" for purposes of rule 403. Decor so, 1999 UT 57, \ 32. In Holbert, this Court 
referred to an interval of approximately three months as "minimal." 2002 UT App 426, 
Tf 4-1. The interval in this case was not one of months or even weeks, but was instead 
approximately 45 minutes. 
Third, the State needed this evidence. As discussed above, because there was no 
forensic evidence linking defendant to the Wilbert shooting, the State had to prove its 
case based on eyewitness testimony alone. Though Michael Wilbert testified that 
defendant fired a .380 at him from the moving car, R. 343: 132-33, that statement was 
directly contradicted at trial by Porter, who now claimed that defendant did not have a 
gun during the Wilbert confrontation. R. 343: 175, 195-96. Porter's statements 
regarding the shooting at the apartment therefore corroborated Michael Wilbert's claim 
that defendant had a .380 during their confrontation earlier that night, and they also 
rebutted his new claim that defendant did not have a .380 earlier that evening. 
Finally, this testimony was not the type that would lead to "unfair prejudice," Utah 
R. Evid. R. 403, or "'rouse the jury to overmastering hostility.'" Holbert, 2002 UT App 
426, T| 32 (citation omitted). In State v. Maurer, 770 P.2d 981 (Utah 1989), the Utah 
Supreme Court noted that "all effective evidence is prejudicial in the sense of being 
damaging to the party against whom it is offered." Id. at 984. Given this, "prejudice 
trial. In State v. Johnson, 748 P.2d 1069 (Utah 1987), the supreme court specifically held 
that "the severance of two crimes for trial does not necessarily preclude the admission of 
evidence of the severed crime in the trial of the other." Id. at 1075. 
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which calls for exclusion is given a more specialized meaning: an undue tendency to 
suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly but not necessarily an emotional one, 
such as bias, sympathy, hatred, contempt, retribution, or horror." Id. at 984 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). Evidence is therefore deemed to be directed at an 
"improper basis" when it has an undue tendency to "cause the jury to base its decision on 
something other than the established propositions of the case." State v. Lindgren, 910 
P.2d 1268, 1272 (Utah App. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
There was nothing emotional or diversionary about this testimony. Given the 
court's instructions, this jury did not hear that defendant had actually shot someone with 
his gun at his apartment, nor did it learn that there had been anything criminal or 
wrongful about his conduct there. Instead, the jury simply learned that defendant 
possessed an operable handgun and that he had fired it. Gun possession is neither 
criminal nor uncommon in this state, so defendant was clearly not prejudiced by Porter's 
testimony regarding defendant's possession of a gun. The fact that defendant fired it is of 
no particular consequence either. Absent any evidence to the contrary, the jury could 
have made any number of innocuous assumptions regarding that shooting, such as that 
defendant accidentally misfired his gun. This Court should therefore disregard 
defendant's unsupported speculation that this decidedly neutral information was 
inherently and unfairly prejudicial. 
To the extent that defendant was prejudiced by this testimony, it was only because 
this particular gun matched the description of the gun that he was seen firing at Michael 
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Wilbert during their confrontation approximately 45 minutes earlier. This is probative 
prejudice, not unfair prejudice, and it was not precluded by rules 403 or 404(b).5 
5. Even if the admission of the challenged testimony was error, it was 
harmless error. 
"[E]ven if we assume that the evidence was improper, an appellate court will not 
overturn a jury verdict for the admission of improper evidence if the admission of the 
evidence did not reasonably effect the likelihood of a different verdict." Houskeeper, 
2002 UT 1185 Tf 26. "Moreover, as a general rule, in reviewing a jury verdict we assume 
that the jury believed the evidence supporting the verdict." State v. Brown, 948 P.2d 
337, 343-44 (Utah 1997). 
Although the State was not able to forensically prove that defendant fired a gun at 
Michael Wilbert, it nevertheless offered testimony that otherwise supported its claim. 
Porter testified that he and defendant had followed the Wilberts home, and he then 
described the "angry" confrontation that ensued in the middle of the street. R. 343: 168-
5
 Defendant also suggests that this Court should incorporate rule 609, Utah Rules 
of Evidence, into its rule 404(b) analysis. Aplt. Br. 17-20. This Court has previously 
held that if evidence is admissible under rule 404(b), consideration under rule 609 is 
unnecessary. State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, % 29 n.3, 61 P.3d 291; State v. O'Neil, 
848 P.2d 694, 701 n.7 (Utah App. 1993). As set forth above, the challenged testimony is 
admissible under rule 404(b), thereby negating any need for a rule 609 analysis. 
In any event, rule 609 is inapplicable to this case. Rule 609 applies when a party 
attempts to introduce evidence of a witness's "conviction" for "the purpose of attacking 
the credibility" of that witness. Defendant had not been tried, let alone convicted of the 
Montes shooting at the time of this trial. Rule 609 and the interpretive cases cited by 
defendant are therefore inapplicable to this case. Defendant also "did not object to the 
evidence in the context of rules 608 and 609" below, and this Court should accordingly 
"decline to engage in further analysis" of the rule 609 argument. Holbert, 2002 UT App 
4 2 6 4 29 n.3. 
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74.6 Defendant did not testify or in any way deny that claim. Stacy Wilbert then saw 
defendant with a gun, shouted a warning to her husband, and fled toward her house. 
Moments later, she heard a firecracker-like noise and told a roommate that "they were 
shooting at Michael." A neighbor also testified that she heard a noise that sounded like a 
gunshot during that timeframe as well. More importantly, Michael Wilbert testified that 
he saw and heard defendant's shot, and recognized it as coming from a .380 
semiautomatic. 
Thus, even without the testimony regarding the subsequent shooting at defendant's 
apartment, the State still presented competent testimony from multiple sources that 
supported its central claims. If this Court holds that the testimony should have been 
excluded under rule 404(b), this Court should hold that the error was harmless and 
accordingly still affirm the conviction. 
B. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing the State to introduce 
evidence regarding defendant's drug deal with Stacy Wilbert 
Defendant next claims that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the 
State to introduce testimony regarding his drug deal with Stacy Wilbert. This claim 
should be rejected. 
As a threshold matter, this Court should reject this claim under the invited error 
doctrine. "The invited error doctrine prevents a party from taking advantage of an error 
6
 At trial, Porter initially denied having followed the Wilberts. R. 343: 162. After 
the State received permission to treat him as a hostile witness, Porter admitted to having 
"flip[ped] around" behind the Wilberts, R. 343: 167, but still claimed that he and 
defendant had "just happened to come upon" the Wilberts in front of their home. R. 343: 
173. Upon further questioning, Porter admitted to "follow[ing] the same path" as the 
Wilberts as they drove toward their home. R. 343: 190. 
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committed at trial when that party led the trial court into committing the error. 
Affirmative representations that a party has no objection to the proceedings fall within 
the scope of the invited error doctrine because such representations reassure the trial 
court and encourage it to proceed without further consideration of the issues." 
Tschaggeny v. Milbanklns. Co., 2007 UT 37, f 12, 576 Utah Adv. Rep. 24 (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). In this case, defense counsel affirmatively stated that 
he thought the evidence regarding the drug deal was admissible. R. 342: 14 ("I don't 
think that we can . . . stop the State from asking them about drugs. We don't agree with 
it, we don't agree that what they're saying is true, and I can deal with that in cross-
examination. I suppose if they want to claim that Mr. Pectol said that, then that's 
something we have to do."); 342: 25 ("[The] Drug testimony is fine."). At trial, defense 
counsel affirmatively raised this issue when cross-examining several of the State's 
witnesses. While cross-examining Michael Wilbert, for example, the following exchange 
occurred: 
Q: Now, you indicated that you'd known Eric for a couple of months before all 
this happened, would that be about right? 
A: Yeah. 
Q: And the relationship—and I'll tell you that your wife was in here earlier and 
testified before the jury and described a relationship basically that involved the use 
of drugs. Would that be your view of what the relationship between you and your 
wife and Eric was? 
A: Yes sir, use and sale of— 
Q: I'm sorry? 
A: Use and sale. 
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Q: And according to Stacy she was doing the selling primarily; is that right? 
A: Yes. 
R. 343: 139-40. Defendant similarly raised it when cross-examining Stacy Wilbert. R. 
343: 100-03, and again during his closing statement. R. 344: 385 (informing the jury that 
it was "entitled to know" about the "elements of drug involvement" in the case). A 
defendant cannot concede admissibility below and then contest admissibility on appeal. 
Defendant's concession below invited the error of which he now complains, and this 
Court should accordingly decline to address it. 
Even if this Court addresses this claim on the merits, it should still be rejected. 
First, the testimony was offered for a proper purpose under rule 404(b). Rule 
404(b) expressly allows bad act evidence to be introduced for purposes of establishing a 
party's motive. In Bisner, for example, the Utah Supreme Court held that evidence of a 
prior drug deal between the defendant and his victim was admissible "for the 
noncharacter purpose of proving [defendant's] motive and intent in killing" the victim. 
2001UT99,^[57. 
Bad act evidence can also be admitted in order to provide context for the State's 
case. This Court has previously held that a prosecutor is "entitled to paint a factual 
picture of the context in which the events in question transpired" and can present 
evidence of bad acts "as background information" if needed to explain "how the charges 
against [the defendant] came forward." State v. Morgan, 813 P.2d 1207, 1210 n.4 (Utah 
App. 1991). Thus, bad acts can be discussed "to show the general circumstances 
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surrounding" the crime at issue. State v. Pierce, 111 P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986); see also 
State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30, \ 24, 25 P.3d 985 (allowing presentation of prior bad acts as 
"background" for the State's case-in-chief); State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 882 (Utah 
1978) (allowing the State to present evidence regarding the "circumstances" surrounding 
a crime); State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, f 21, 72 P.2d 127 (allowing 
presentation of prior criminal history when presented as "context for admissible 
evidence"). 
In this case, defendant stole the Wilberts' Blazer as a means of satisfying a drug 
debt. When the Wilberts retrieved their Blazer, defendant followed them home, pulled 
out a gun, and demanded money. A confrontation then ensued that culminated in 
defendant firing his weapon at Michael Wilbert from a moving vehicle. Defendant's 
drug debt was appropriately offered to provide context for this roadside encounter, as 
well as to establish defendant's motive for brandishing and firing a weapon at the 
Wilberts. 
Second, defendant's drug deal with Stacy Wilbert was relevant under rule 402. 
As noted above, "if the evidence has relevancy to explain the circumstances surrounding 
the instant crime, it is admissible for that purpose; and the fact that it may tend to connect 
the defendant with another crime[, wrong, or act] will not render it incompetent." 
Johnson, 784 P.2d at 1141. The drug deal in question helped explain the circumstances 
of the shooting at issue, and was therefore relevant under rule 402. Defendant's motive 
also made it more likely that defendant really did pull a gun and fire it at Michael Wilbert 
during their confrontation. 
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Third, the testimony regarding defendant's drug deal with Stacy Wilbert did not 
violate rule 403. As explained, rule 403 is violated when the danger of unfair prejudice 
substantially outweighs the probative value of the evidence in question. In this case, 
defendant claims that he was unfairly prejudiced because the jury learned that he was a 
drug dealer. 
The challenged testimony did not just show that defendant was a drug dealer, but 
also showed that Stacy Wilbert was heavily involved with drugs as well. In fact, the 
State's claim was that Stacy Wilbert was defendant's drug dealer and that defendant was 
primarily involved in this particular drug deal as a financier. R. 343: 81-83. Thus, if 
testimony regarding this drug deal prejudiced the jury, that prejudice would have run both 
directions, thus negating the alleged prejudice to defendant. Defendant's counsel 
highlighted this exact dichotomy in his closing statement, referring to the State's 
witnesses as "all bad people," noting that "everybody is involved in drugs," and 
describing the State's case as being that "we've got drug dealers that are mad at each 
other." R. 344:377,386. 
Regardless, rule 403 does not forbid all prejudicial testimony, but instead only 
forbids that which is "unfairly" prejudicial. The testimony regarding the drug deal did 
not have an undue tendency to "cause the jury to base its decision on something other 
than the established propositions of the case." Lindgren, 910 P.2d at 1272 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted). It instead focused the jury on the animus between 
the defendant and his victims, which was directly at issue in this crime of violence. Rule 
403 was not violated by the admission of any of this testimony. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm defendant's conviction. 
Respectfully submitted July 27, 2007. 
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